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How Can History of Science Matter
to Scientists?
By Jane Maienschein,* Manfred Laubichler,** and Andrea Loettgers***
ABSTRACT
History of science has developed into a methodologically diverse discipline, adding
greatly to our understanding of the interplay between science, society, and culture. Along
the way, one original impetus for the then newly emerging discipline—what George
Sarton called the perspective “from the point of view of the scientist”—dropped out of
fashion. This essay shows, by means of several examples, that reclaiming this interaction
between science and history of science yields interesting perspectives and new insights for
both science and history of science. The authors consequently suggest that historians of
science also adopt this perspective as part of their methodological repertoire.
I N THIS ESSAY we explore the question of what difference the history of science canmake for scientists, working in the lab, doing science. We purposely do not offer general
prescriptions about the value of history for science; rather, we present some concrete
examples and suggest some conclusions that warrant further study and testing. Our
approach is a response to earlier answers to this question that we see as too schematic and
lacking in detail. If we truly want history of science to have a broader impact in everyday
science and with practicing scientists, we need to get beyond sweeping views and look at
particular cases and their implications. Yet it is worth reminding ourselves briefly what
these earlier suggestions offered, so that we can respond and build further most effec-
tively.
George Sarton, one of the founders of the modern discipline of history of science,
emphasized that one of its perspectives represents the “point of view of the scientist.”1 The
others were, of course, those of the historian and the philosopher. According to Sarton,
history offers scientists a critical point of view that allows them to understand the
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interrelations among different disciplines and approaches and therefore helps them to
overcome the dangers of mere “empiricism.”
In 1974, Stephen Brush asked “Should the History of Science Be Rated X?” He focused
on the generation of future scientists and the role of history in science education,
suggesting that perhaps history undercuts the treasured myths of how science works and
will “do violence to the professional ideal and public image of scientists as rational,
open-minded investigators, proceeding methodically, grounded incontrovertibly in the
outcome of controlled experiments, and seeking objectively for the truth, let the chips fall
where they may.” Brush was writing at a time when history of science and the historians
writing it still remained close to the science. Often they were scientists by training, though
the professionalization of the field was already bringing new Ph.D. graduates with
historical or philosophical backgrounds into the field. This matters because of the sets of
assumptions the scholars carried. Brush pointed to various efforts to bring history into the
teaching of science and some of the “subversive” impacts of such approaches. He
acknowledged the tensions in the fact that retrospectively directed whiggish history is
what the science teacher wants, while historians are exhorted to avoid such whiggism.
“The result,” Brush noted in 1974, “is a widening gap between the goals of the historian
and of the science teacher.”2
In 2000, Jane Maienschein published a revision of her Sarton Lecture, presented at
the 1996 American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in collab-
oration with the History of Science Society. By that time, the professional field of
history of science had changed considerably. As Polly Winsor noted in an essay
published later, proper historians knew to avoid whiggism and even to avoid serving
as handmaidens to the will of scientists and science educators. The field had inten-
tionally moved away from science, and Maienschein was concerned about that fact.
She offered several suggestions— basically the traditional answers to the question,
Why study history of science?— clustered into five categories, suggesting that history
might promote
●Self-improvement, illuminating science and making it better
●Efficiency, avoiding and learning from past mistakes
●Perspective, providing judgment and clarity and therefore making science better
●Imagination, offering a wider repertoire of ideas to choose from
●Education, improving public understanding of science and scientific literacy.3
This was a start in approaching the question, but only a start. It remained to cash out
what each of these claims really meant, whether these traditional arguments were the best
or only ways in which history of science might matter for science, and whether we have
concrete examples. In this essay, we turn to concrete examples and what they show. We
feel that it is time to rebuild the close connections between history and science that can,
under the right circumstances and with the right approaches, illuminate and improve both
fields.
2 Stephen G. Brush, “Should the History of Science Be Rated X?” Science, 1974, 183:1164–1171, on pp. 1164,
1170.
3 Mary P. Winsor, “The Practitioner of Science: Everyone Her Own Historian,” Journal of the History of
Biology, 2001, 34:229–245; and Jane Maienschein, “Why Study History for Science?” Biology and Philosophy,
2000, 15:339–348, on p. 342.
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INTERSECTIONS OF HISTORY AND SCIENCE
We begin in this section with a brief introduction to three examples taken from personal
experience. Each presents an instance where thinking about history made a difference,
sometimes in small ways and sometimes in promoting different ways of thinking. In no
case is the history being distorted in any way or serving a merely instrumental value for
the science. Rather, in each case the work remains true to the highest standards of
historical scholarship. Each exemplary case relates to developmental biology, and each
warrants examination in more detail.
The first example is Ross Granville Harrison’s tissue culture experimental work,
published in 1907–1910 and now recognized as the first stem-cell experiment, though it
was not called that at the time. The story begins as Maienschein was carrying out her
dissertation research, asking in what sense the particular experiment had served as a
“crucial experiment” in resolving the long-standing debate about epigenesis versus pre-
formation. Some biologists argued that the nerve fibers that make up the complex nervous
system are already in the egg cell from the beginning and just grow out along preestab-
lished bridges. Camillo Golgi was one of these, and he developed wonderful silver nitrate
preparations for staining neural tissue to provide evidence for his interpretation. At the
same time, others—such as Santiago Ramo´n y Cajal—made equally excellent prepara-
tions, sometimes using the same techniques, but saw something quite different. Ramo´n y
Cajal saw the complex system emerging gradually, as each cell found its independent
path.4
Harrison realized that the only way to resolve the debate would be through some
different approach—specifically, with a controlled experimental manipulation of the
neuroblast cells. He carried out the experiment, which demonstrated that nerve fibers have
the capacity to stretch through outgrowth and take on the shapes they do in normal
conditions. The experiment was quickly labeled as crucial and won the day for the
epigenetic interpretation.
Maienschein replicated Harrison’s experiment as exactly as possible in order to under-
stand better what he did and the choices he made. The embryologist on her doctoral
committee, Robert Briggs (who along with Thomas King is well known for doing the first
frog cloning in the 1950s), helped. He guided her in setting up the lab, cutting out
neuroblast cells, and establishing the frog lymph cultures that Harrison described. They
grew various wandering microbiological things, some quite beautiful, but never nerve
cells. Harrison clearly had not made this up, so what was going wrong? Maienschein went
back to Harrison’s archival notes and to the records at Johns Hopkins (where he had gotten
the procedure to work once) and at Yale (where he reported that the process was much
more successful). It turned out that when Harrison first arrived at Yale, his lab was not
ready for him. He set up temporarily near the bacteriologists and apparently learned
bacteriological techniques for maintaining aseptic conditions.5 He never recorded what
has since been called the “tacit knowledge,” but Maienschein and Briggs discovered the
importance of the details of the practice.
The point here is not just that replicating historical experiments is fun and involves
detective work. What is interesting is Briggs’s reaction. He noted that this leading
4 For further discussion see Jane Maienschein, “Experimental Biology in Transition: Harrison’s Embryology,
1895–1910,” Studies in History of Biology, 1983, 6:107–127.
5 Jane Maienschein, “Ross Harrison’s Crucial Experiment as a Foundation for Modern American Experimen-
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experimental embryologist, even in his most famous research publications, had made
important assumptions that he had not recorded. Briggs, in turn, realized that he had made
assumptions about how the experiment was done. Being aware of the value of examining
basic assumptions wherever possible can improve scientific work. Briggs noted that this
case reminded him to examine his assumptions, and he reported the lesson to his students.
This historical case reinforced the lesson learned when he had assumed that nuclear
transplantation in frogs can work successfully only in the very earliest egg stages but John
Gurdon had shown a decade later that such cloning could occur with later-stage eggs as
well. And though Briggs had died by then, the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep in 1997
demonstrated—contrary to earlier assumptions—that even somatic cells could be trans-
ferred and could develop into a normal sheep. The historical example showed dramatically
the value of accident (Harrison’s being placed temporarily next to the bacteriologists) and
the significance of assumptions.
A second example is Viktor Hamburger’s study of his dissertation advisor Hans
Spemann. Hamburger was an excellent neuroembryologist at Washington University in
St. Louis, and after he retired he spent many hours talking about the history of embryology
with the historian Garland E. Allen, his friend and colleague. Allen helped persuade
Hamburger to write up his story, and they devised the approach of writing as narrative all
the parts that were documented and met the highest standards of historical scholarship. But
Allen did not want to lose Hamburger’s own recollections, so Hamburger included these
in italics interspersed through the rest of the story.
Hamburger was already retired, so his turning to history did not inform his own
scientific work. But he wanted scientists to read his biographical study of Spemann, and
he wanted to make two main points. First, he felt strongly the importance of giving
appropriate credit for work done. Part of his motivation for writing the book, he reported,
was his wish to give Hilde Pro¨scholdt Mangold the credit she deserved for carrying out
the experiment for which Spemann received a Nobel Prize. He did not deny that Spemann
deserved the prize, but he wanted to explain the nature of the work and the relative
contributions to it. This was especially instructive, since many embryologists felt that
Hamburger deserved his own Nobel Prize for his work on nerve growth factor done in his
lab and by researchers who over time have given him less and less credit. The second
lesson Hamburger wanted to get across was the messiness of study of the tissue that came
to be called the “organizer” and the process of “induction” of the embryonic structure and
function. Though he may have carried out what came to be seen as definitive experimental
work establishing the mechanisms of development, Spemann himself remained something
of a vitalist. Like Briggs, Hamburger discovered and laid out the importance of examining
and dissecting assumptions.6
Finally, Manfred Laubichler and Maienschein have had the pleasure of working with
William C. Aird, who is Chief of Molecular and Vascular Medicine at Harvard Medical
School. Aird has put together a remarkable book of nearly two thousand pages, really a
compendium of everything anybody seems to know about the endothelium.7 When he
began this project, he asked Maienschein to help coordinate a set of two- to three-page
descriptions of the contributions of historical figures to what we now know. This is where
many scientists begin with history—with an interest in anecdotes and a sketch of the
6 Viktor Hamburger, The Heritage of Experimental Embryology: Hans Spemann and the Organizer (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1988).
7 William C. Aird, ed., Endothelial Biomedicine (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).
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background to current work. Unfortunately, most scientists end there. Aird did not.
Instead, he brought the two of us into the collaboration, and we all began to learn
tremendously more than any of us would have alone.
We all discovered, first, that the standard picture of the history of endothelial biology
has missed a great deal. That is not so surprising. It also turned out that much of what
scientists thought they knew from textbook renditions was either inaccurate or inadequate,
and that is not so surprising either. What is surprising is that we began to realize that the
very term “endothelium” came from Wilhelm His in 1865, arising in the context of his
study of the development of the different tissue layers and in work completely ignored by
the textbook representations.8
A close look at the history of the science shows that the endothelium was identified as
a distinctive tissue with unique functions because of its developmental history. Studying
the history makes it clearer that researchers today are ignoring the important origins of the
endothelium. History shows that today’s attempts to understand the endothelial role in
stem-cell development of red blood cells or of pathogenic vascular lining would benefit
from study not just of adult vessels but also of the details of embryological development.
This was not obvious until we looked closely at the history. Similarly, Laubichler
pointed out that looking not just at humans (which scientists in medical schools and
hospitals obviously tend to do), but also at evolutionary relationships with other species,
would illuminate the development of the structure and function of the endothelium and of
its pathological conditions. Aird is such a fascinating Renaissance man that he has now
taken up serious historical study as a result of this collaboration, and he is convinced that
this is not a distraction from but, rather, an enhancement of his extremely well-funded and
significant scientific work. In this case, the history has made a substantive difference for
the science and for the scientist.
EMBEDDING A HISTORIAN IN A LAB
For over a year, Andrea Loettgers has been part of the group of the synthetic biologist
Michael Elowitz at the California Institute of Technology.9 What makes this collaboration
especially relevant for our investigation of how the history of science can matter to
scientists is that it goes beyond the more traditional arrangements in which historians and
social scientists have assumed that they can act as detached observers while studying the
activities inside laboratories as cases of “science in action.” In this case, the historian has
become an active participant and collaborator in the ongoing activities of the lab. At the
same time, she has contributed to insights into the development of synthetic biology,
which in turn have helped to shape a historical project on the role of physical and
mathematical models in the life sciences. The collaboration thus goes both ways.
In order to see how history can matter in a cutting-edge field of science, we first need
to introduce a bit of context for synthetic biology. The goal of synthetic biology is to
understand complex biological systems by building a synthetic model of parts of these
systems and subsequently by engineering existing biological systems for new purposes.
Methodologically, one starts with an abstract mathematical model that describes—for
example—the circadian clock. On the basis of these descriptions, synthetic biologists then
8 Wilhelm His, Die Ha¨ute und Ho¨hlen des Ko¨rpers (Basel: Schwighauser, 1865), p. 18.
9 On this research group see http://www.elowitz.caltech.edu/people.html; and D. Sprinzak and M. B. Elowitz,
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engineer synthetic networks and test their behavior by implementing them into cells. A
good example is the Repressilator introduced by Stanislas Leibler and Michael Elowitz in
2000.10 The Repressilator models rhythmic behavior and allows researchers to visualize
the oscillation in protein production by linking it to the synthesis of a fluorescent green
protein. The protein oscillations in individual cells can be recorded using time-lapse
movies and later interpreted.
The collaboration with this group started when Elowitz and Loettgers discovered a
common interest in the representational relationships between models and biological
systems and functions. For Elowitz, this was of immediate practical importance: synthetic
biology involves different types of models (mathematical and material) and complex
experimental manipulations, such as incorporating into cells artificial regulatory networks
that are often difficult to interpret. Furthermore, the whole field of synthetic biology is still
viewed with suspicion by large parts of the scientific community. A clear understanding
of the underlying assumptions, as well as the limits and possibilities of the new methods,
is thus crucial for gaining wider acceptance.
Questions regarding the representational relationship between model and object have
been widely discussed by philosophers of science such as Mary Hesse, Ronald Giere, Bas
van Fraassen, Mary Morgan, and Margaret Morrison, among others. Given the pressure
and competition, however, especially in rapidly moving “hot” fields like synthetic biology,
one cannot expect scientists to be aware of this literature. Furthermore, scientists usually
do not assume that the history and philosophy of science could be of value for their actual
research.
Loettgers’s interest in synthetic models grew out of her previous historical work on the
Hopfield model, one of the most influential models in neuroscience.11 The Hopfield model
is closely related to the engineered genetic networks used by synthetic biologists, with
both depending on robust interdisciplinarity. In representing structures and functions of
biological systems, both modeling approaches use concepts from disciplines outside of
biology, such as physics and engineering. In both cases the use of these concepts is
critically related to core assumptions about the structures and functions of biological
systems.
In the case of the Hopfield model, the critical assumption is that the structure and
mechanism represented by the model of a disordered magnetic system is of such a general
character that it can also be used in the representation of biological neural networks and
functions such as auto-associative memory. Synthetic models are based on the assumption
that feedback loops adequately describe the mechanisms of gene regulation. The main
difference between synthetic models and the Hopfield model is that the latter is an abstract
mathematical model while synthetic models are engineered out of biological components
and therefore have the same material composition as the object they represent. Synthetic
models are thus hybrid models, combining aspects from abstract mathematical models and
experiments. The critical epistemological question that interested Loettgers is how hybrid
models can generate empirical evidence for or against the assumptions made in their
design that goes beyond the insights already gained by abstract mathematical models.
Surprisingly, another question soon dominated the discussions between Loettgers and
10 M. B. Elowitz and S. Leibler, “A Synthetic Oscillatory Network of Transcriptional Regulators,” Nature,
2000, 403:335–338.
11 John J. Hopfield, “Neural Networks and Physical Systems with Emergent Collective Computational
Abilities,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1982, 79:2554–2558.
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the Elowitz group: Can a historian embedded in a laboratory research group contribute to
the ongoing research there? The answer turned out to be yes—and in important ways.
Analyzing the core assumptions that underlie different modeling strategies—something
historians are trained to do—was valuable, since synthetic biologists rely heavily on
models and concepts that originate outside the biological sciences. Understanding the
limitations and imperfect adaptability of these models—asking, for instance, how the
model could incorporate experimental noise of biological systems—turned out to be
crucial to progress in the lab. As part of their collaboration, both parties had to become
familiar with the different languages and shorthands in their respective fields of synthetic
biology and history and philosophy of science, an exercise that took some time and was
not always easy but that is essential for any form of interdisciplinary collaboration. This
work allowed them to explore the advantages, limits, and relations of the different model
types from a variety of different angles. These discussions then became the basis for
exploring the limits and possibilities of synthetic models such as the Repressilator.
The lessons of this interaction between a historian and a cutting-edge laboratory in
synthetic biology are twofold. First, historical perspectives helped to clarify the assump-
tions and concepts used in model design and to address the uncertainty inherent in the
representational relationships between the engineered model and the regulatory gene
networks of biological systems. Second, historical analysis helped to contextualize the
specific modeling approach used in synthetic biology. These aspects of interdisciplinary
collaboration are interrelated and combine philosophical as well as historical perspectives.
They took time and willingness on both sides to invest in understanding each other’s
language and assumptions, but the results have been transformative.
HISTORY AS INTEGRAL TO THEORETICAL SCIENCE
Integration of different theoretical perspectives, models, and experimental systems is the
bread and butter of interdisciplinary research. And as science becomes increasingly inter-
or transdisciplinary, integration is gaining in importance. Here we argue that in areas of
science that involve crossing disciplinary boundaries, the history of the discipline(s), their
problems and methods, and, most important, the history of their conceptual development
are crucial parts of the science itself. While we think that this is true for all sciences, our
discussion is focused specifically on biology and in this example on theoretical biology.12
In general, critical historical evaluations are needed because the crucial assumptions
and conceptual constraints, the details of the central experimental systems or original
formal models, as well as the supporting data and measurements, are generally not
included in current or semiaxiomatic formulations of most (biological) theories. It is,
therefore, not surprising that many models and theories in biology are currently used
mostly pragmatically: scientists tend to know which ones “work” and tend to modify or
adapt them to different data rather than reevaluating their fundamental assumptions.
However, in cases in which substantial revisions are required, researchers generally go
back to the original literature in order to uncover precisely those assumptions that have
constrained the model or theory in the past. In this sense, history is an essential part of the
avant-garde of biology.
It should come as no surprise that looking at the history of biology as an integral part
12 Manfred D. Laubichler, “The Specter of the Past: What the History of Theoretical Biology Means Today,”
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of biology has implications for the practice of the history of science. Sarton had already
seen the history of science as a pluralistic endeavor, capturing the viewpoints of the
historian, the scientist, and the philosopher, respectively. Within each of these (and today
there are even more viewpoints involved), the history of biology is presented according to
different criteria of interest and relevance. From the point of view of a biologist, as we
have seen, history can serve several important functions. Such a history of science will
differ from other approaches such as cultural or social history of science. It will be largely
a history of concepts, theories, experiments, measurement procedures, assumptions, mod-
els, and tools focused on the evaluation of the intrinsic logic of biological concepts and
theories and the epistemological questions and assumptions of biology.
We can also rephrase this last point in biological terminology: such an analytical history
of biological thinking and practice has a function like that of developing a respectable
phylogeny. Only when we know the evolutionary history and relationships can we really
understand the detailed features of any particular organism; similarly, only when we
understand the evolutionary history and relationships of the concepts and theories of
biology within the contexts where they first emerged can we really understand the detailed
features of the particular assumptions and practices within science. And, even though
many biologists are content to use a phylogeny (whether of organisms or of ideas) that is
handed to them, the biologists we have pointed to have come to recognize it as a legitimate
and complex scientific endeavor to investigate and establish these phylogenies. They have
come to see this historical exercise as serving in many ways as the basis for their
biological research and as a foundation of current biology. The history helps provide the
necessary context for conceptual innovation and synthesis.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented examples where history has made a difference to the science and
science to the history. Some are past and some are ongoing projects. Let us look at one
example of a central problem in biology where we believe history can, should, and—we
hope—will make a difference in informing the science. Gene concepts have received quite
a bit of attention from historians of biology, with studies drawing on all three of Sarton’s
historical, philosophical, and biological “points of view” on a problem.13 We see how
different conceptions of the gene (as the unit of inheritance, the physical gene, or the
physiological or developmental gene) have emerged in the context of specific theoretical
problems and experimental practices. The last concept has been part of several research
programs aimed at understanding the physiological actions of genes in development,
especially the problem of differentiation—a problem that itself has a most illustrious
history. Prominent examples include Richard Goldschmidt’s studies on sex determination
in Lymantria, Alfred Ku¨hn’s work on wing patterns and eye coloration in Ephestia, and,
more recently, Eric Davidson’s work on the regulation of gene expression in develop-
ment.14
13 Peter J. Beurton, Raphael Falk, and Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger, eds., The Concept of the Gene in Development
and Evolution: Historical and Epistemological Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000).
14 Eric H. Davidson, The Regulatory Genome (Burlington, Mass.: Academic, 2006); Gerald L. Geison and
Manfred D. Laubichler, “Reflections on the Role of Organismal and Cultural Variation in the History of the
Biological Sciences,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2001, 32:1–29; and Laubichler
and Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger, “Alfred Ku¨hn (1885–1968) and Developmental Evolution,” Journal of Experimen-
tal Zoology, Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 2004, 302:103–110.
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Yet the biological research remains dispersed in different labs and focused on different
aspects of heredity and development. Arriving at a comprehensive theory that connects
genes with development and evolution is one of the main challenges of biology today, as
seen in Evo Devo programs. However, substantial stumbling blocks remain. Different
assumptions and practices present barriers, as do the different languages of different
disciplines. Loettgers’s work within a lab pursuing cutting-edge biological research, and
the concomitant demonstration of the necessity of history for theory and the value of
history in uncovering assumptions and helping facilitate translations, shows that history
can help. By working with biologists, rather than simply in their own silos, historians of
science can help identify and interpret the original assumptions and constraints underlying
different models, theories, and practices—by providing an analytical history of both.
To conclude, our briefly sketched examples support the thesis that the history of biology
“from the point of view of the scientist” is an integral part of biology (and science more
generally), has already contributed to current attempts to establish new theoretical per-
spectives, and has great potential for contributing in many additional ways. If this happens
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